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FEMINIST LAWMAKING AND HISTORICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS: BRINGING THE PAST INTO THE FUTURE
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
This symposium' honors the inaugural conference of the National
Women Law Students Association at the University of Virginia
School of Law in February 1994. When Stephanie Webster, one of the
organizers of the conference, called to invite me to participate in this
symposium and told me about the formation of the Association, I was
surprised. I mentioned to her that from 1970 to 1992 there had been an
annual National Conference on Women and the Law which had in-
cluded law students and lawyers. She, too, was surprised, since she
had never heard about the National Conference. That conversation
sparked this essay. The fact that a whole new generation of women
law students did not know about this organization seemed problematic
because, as I will describe more fully, it played a crucial role in
shaping feminist legal history over the last twenty-five years. At the
same time, since the National Conference no longer existed, I was
happy to see a new generation of women law students taking the
initiative to form a new organization.
This essay is about feminist legal history: the importance for
feminists in the law to have a sense of history; the importance of rec-
ognizing the ways in which feminists in the law have made history;
and the need to acknowledge and sustain institutions that feminists in
the law have built. This essay is also about the need to move forward
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Sylvia A. Law for comments
and to Suzanne Brackley, Julianne Cowan, and Stephanie Manes for helpful research assis-
tance. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research grant generously supported my research
and writing.
I An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Symposium, "Solidarity, Inclusion
and Representation: Tensions and Possibilities Within Contemporary Feminism," at the
University of Virginia School of Law in February 1994.
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and to make change that is informed by a sense of history. I begin with
a brief description and analysis of the work of the National Conference
on Women and the Law (the Conference), and then consider its impli-
cations for feminist lawmaking and historical consciousness.
I. THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE LAW
The first meeting of the National Conference on Women and the
Law was in 1970 and the last was in 1992. It was an annual conference
organized by feminists in the law. With workshops or presentations on
almost every area of the law, the Conference was an important event
that brought together women law students and lawyers from around
the country for several days and received considerable media atten-
tion.2
Women law students at New York University Law School, includ-
ing Susan Deller Ross and Janice Goodman, organized the first con-
ference in 1970. I attended my first conference in 1971 as. a first-year
law student at New York University Law School. I drove all night
with two other women in my class to get to the conference in Chicago.
It was an extraordinary event. I met many women law students and
lawyers who are now colleagues in law teaching, practicing attorneys,
and federal and state court judges. Each year the Conference was held
at a different law school, and a Steering Committee was appointed to
meet several months in advance to plan the theme of that conference.
One of my favorite memories is of a Steering Committee meeting I
attended in September 1978 in Austin, Texas, with my then two
2 For examples of the array of issues explored by the National Conference on Women and
the Law over twenty years and national media attention which the Conference received, see
Nina Burleigh, Law Blocks Change, Professors Suggest, Chi. Trib., Apr. 26, 1992, § 6, at 4
(reporting that a panel of women law professors advocated advancing new law and new
thinking on legal rights as the best method for achieving women's equality); Cris Carmody,
Fitting Feminism Into Law, Not Theory, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar. 27, 1992, at 1 (stating
that at the 22d Conference, feminist advocates argued for grounding abortion rights in the
theory of equality rather than privacy); Carol Krucoff, Monitoring the Mediators, Wash.
Post, June 1, 1983, at D5 (noting that at the 14th Conference, representatives from the
National Center on Women and Family Law drew attention to the dangers for women in
mediation of divorce and family law disputes); Anastasia Toufexis, Now For a Woman's
Point of View: Feminist Scholars Challenge Male Bias in the U.S. Legal System, Time,
Apr. 17, 1989, at 51 (reporting that over one thousand people gathered for the 20th
Conference, "where feminist scholars explored everything from marriage to murder").
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month-old daughter, Anna, whom I nursed in Pat Cain's outdoor hot
tub.
These conferences were valuable, both personally and profes-
sionally, for the hundreds of women law students, practitioners, and
law teachers around the country who participated. In addition, the
Conference was instrumental in shaping the development of feminist
jurisprudence:
The necessary conditions for the development of femi-
nist jurisprudence arose when women began entering
the law schools in large numbers in the late 1960s. The
presence of these women, and the questions they asked
posed significant challenges to formerly all- or pre-
dominately-male bastions.
In particular, female law students asked why the cur-
riculum was so silent on issues that mattered deeply to
them as women-unequal pay and job opportunities;
rape and sexual assault; battering of wives; reproduc-
tion. The women themselves organized to "fill in" the
gaps in their legal education, forming the National
Conference on Women and the Law.... And the law
schools responded, at varying rates, by creating the first
courses in "Women and the Law," many of which were
later renamed "Sex-Based Discrimination" to reflect the
coming of age in the mid-1970s of new legal avenues
of redress for women's unequal situation.3
Feminist law students carried the Conference home. "Encouraged by
their successful first effort at networking, the women students returned
to their home schools with renewed energy and began agitating on
issues that remain high on the current agenda of legal education:
faculty diversity, curricular reform, and treatment of women students
and women's issues in the classroom." 4
3 Herma H. Kay & Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: What Is It? When Did
It Start? Who Does It?, in Herma H. Kay, Text, Cases, and Materials on Sex-Based
Discrimination 884 (1988).
4 Herma H. Kay, The Future of Women Law Professors, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 5, 12 (1991).
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The conferences were impressive both in their broad scope and
comprehensive coverage of feminist legal perspectives.5 Equally im-
portant, the conferences maintained a sense of history by addressing
and incorporating contemporary issues and historical struggles.
Presentations on family law included custody, child-abuse, and di-
vorce, while other panels focused on gay and lesbian legal issues.
Even in the 1970s, health care speakers addressed issues ranging from
abortion and sterilization to medical ethics. Constitutional law panels
covered such topics as the Equal Rights Amendment, equal protection,
pornography, and reproductive rights. There were panels on employ-
ment discrimination, discrimination against both elderly women and
juveniles, violence against women, the special problems of women of
color and immigrant women within the legal system, and the econom-
ics and impact of women on the workforce. The conferences also cov-
ered the special struggles and treatment of women as lawyers and law
students, and career alternatives for women within the law.
In addition to presentations on law and theory in these areas, the
conferences featured extensive discussion of problems of implementa-
tion and strategy. In 1970, there were no courses or casebooks on
women and the law. There was only an evolving field, and we were
the ones helping it to evolve. Rhonda Copelon and I began to teach a
course entitled "Women and the Law" at Brooklyn Law School in the
spring of 1974, and we developed our course materials with other
lawyers that we knew from the Women and the Law Conference. 6 The
Conference provided crucial opportunities for feminists in the law to
meet, to strategize, and to share ideas with each other. As the
5 The following discussion in the text of the Conference programs is based on the
author's memory and review of the Conference materials. See 8th National Conference on
Women and the Law, Focus (1977); 9th National Conference on Women and the Law,
Women and the Law: A Sourcebook (1978); 1 1th National Conference on Women and the
Law, Sourcebook (1980); 12th National Conference on Women and the Law, 1981
Sourcebook (1981); 13th National Conference on Women and the Law, Women Working
Together (1982); 15th National Conference on Women and the Law, Bread and Roses: The
Economics of Feminism (1984); 16th National Conference on Women and the Law,
Building Bridges Not Walls: Sourcebook (1985). (Conference materials on file with author.)
6 The first casebooks in the area of women and the law were both published in 1974. See
Barbara A. Babcock, Ann E. Freedman, Eleanor H. Norton & Susan C. Ross, Sex
Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies (1974); Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth B.




Conference grew, the needs of students and practitioners for education
and brainstorming diverged. A Feminist Litigation Strategies Project
was developed, designed primarily for more experienced attorneys,
and meetings were held in conjunction with the Conference. Many of
the areas that we now take for granted in the law-sexual harassment,
intimate violence, acquaintance rape, sexual abuse and incest-were
first articulated, explored, and developed in sessions at these meetings.
The Conference also laid the groundwork for much of the early femi-
nist theoretical work that we now take for granted. Yet the last confer-
ence was held in 1992, and from then until February 1994, there was
no national meeting of women law students.
The history of the National Conference on Women and the Law
provides fertile ground for reflection about the importance of feminist
legal history. First, law students can play a central role in making his-
tory, in making change, and in shaping knowledge and information.
Law students initiated the National Conference on Women and the
Law, and through the support of law schools that agreed to sponsor the
Conference, law students helped to develop and shape the scope of the
Conference. Second, it is critically important to know that there is a
history of these conferences, to explore it, and to learn from it; indeed,
a full history of the National Conference on Women and the Law
needs to be written. 7 Third, it is difficult for women to learn our own
history. Women's organizations generally, and women's legal organi-
zations specifically, are traditionally under-funded, run on shoestring
budgets, 8 and are more likely to disappear without leaving the docu-
7 This essay does not attempt to provide a history of the National Conference on Women
and the Law, but focuses on why this history is important and needs to be studied. As
Barbara Babcock has suggested, there are other important organizations of women in law
that would also be important to study such as the National Conference of Women's Bar
Associations, the National Association of Women Judges, and the Section of Women in
Legal Education of the Association of American Law Schools. Barbara A. Babcock,
Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev.
2143, 2144 (1993).
8 See, e.g., Beverly Beyette, Feminism, Philanthropy: Fighting the Funding Gap, L.A.
Times, May 13, 1988, pt. 5, at I (stating that in 1986, grants to organizations aiding women
and girls accounted for 3.6% of total foundation giving); Mary Servatius, Contraception
Key in Abortion Debate, Chi. Trib., May 5, 1989, at 26 (noting the chronic underfunding of
research in the field of contraception for women); Barbara Vobejda, Battered Women's Cry
Relayed Up From Grass Roots, Wash. Post, July 6, 1994, at Al (discussing the problem of
inadequate resources in expanding the network of shelters for battered women).
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mentation and analysis that would allow a history to be pieced to-
gether.9 Finally, it is important that those who have actively partici-
pated in feminist legal work in the past and present help nurture a new
generation of feminist lawyers. Hopefully, this generation can both
imagine new possibilities and understand the historical tensions;
consider the historical context but not be bound by it; work to under-
stand the mistakes of the past and use this understanding to effect
positive change. I explore these themes in the next section.
II. FEMINIST LAWMAKING AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
A group's understanding of its own history can play a crucial role
in assisting group consciousness, identification, and activism. Nancy
Cott has described the important role of women's history for femi-
nism:
The endeavor for truth telling begun by researchers,
teachers and writers of women's history in the past
decade has served a "consciousness-raising" function:
women who learn more fully about their own history
often become more conscious of identification with
their gender group, more aware that their personal cir-
cumstances carry the legacy of sex-specific historical
experience, more determined to advance their position
as women. Since the appearance of modern feminist
thought, the rise of feminist activism and interest in
women's history have been symbiotic.
... Women's history concerns not only what
was done to women, but also what was done by
women-often exclusively among women. To see both
the cultural and subcultural roles played by women is to
9 For an example of effective historical analysis of grass-roots feminist efforts, see Judith
Sealander & Dorothy Smith, The Rise and Fall of Feminist Organizations in the 1970s:
Dayton as a Case Study, 12 Feminist Stud. 321 (1986).
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understand the coexistence of strengths and subordi-
nation. 10
Women have made history in the law in this country through the
process of feminist lawmaking. Women have shaped the law by
imagining the law differently. We have developed theory from prac-
tice, turned that new theory into practice, and then brought it back to
theory." Over the last twenty years there has been an explosion of
litigation and theoretical work that has challenged every aspect of the
law. But this explosion is based on and has developed from the ex-
traordinarily rich historical legacy that has come before. As I have
suggested, most of the women's issues that have been in the forefront
of recent popular culture, such as acquaintance rape, sexual harass-
ment, family leave, reproductive freedom, and intimate violence, were
long-standing topics of workshops at the National Conference and
were first explored at conference meetings beginning in the 1970s. As
the women's legal movement developed, there were many other
meetings and forums at which feminist lawyers strategized about these
issues, but for many women law students and lawyers, the National
Conference was a first and continuing exposure to the exciting work
that was being developed.
Unfortunately, it is easy to forget the historical legacy of the
National Conference. The failure to remember history can have seri-
ous consequences. I offer two examples. During Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, Anita Hill raised the
issue of sexual harassment, and there was a sense of national shock
about this issue. Many highly educated people with whom I spoke,
including many law professors, suggested that this was because it was
the first time that this "new" issue had emerged in a public forum. Yet
feminist legal work on issues of sexual harassment was more than
10 Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck, Introduction to A Heritage Of Her Own: Toward A
New Social History Of Women 9-16 (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979). For
examples of modem feminist historians' efforts to recapture women's history and to reex-
amine the construction of history itself, see Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic:
Intellect and Ideology In Revolutionary America (1986); Joan W. Scott, Gender and the
Politics of History (1988); Root of Bitterness: Documents of the Social History of American
Women (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1972).
11 For a discussion of this process, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986).
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twenty years old at the time of the Thomas confirmation hearings, and
there already existed a highly developed body of case law, including a
major United States Supreme Court opinion addressing the importance
of the issue. 12 Many reported cases on sexual harassment contain fact
patterns that were viewed as "incredible" in Anita Hill's allegations,
such as the use of pornography. The fact that the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the media failed to pay attention to this historical leg-
acy and that feminist lawyers and scholars were not able to present ex-
pert testimony on the history and complexity of sexual harassment
meant that this history and case law on sexual harassment was ignored.
The public was misled and the Senate was poorly educated about this
issue because of the misperception that it was "new."
Current controversy about the use of the word "feminism" also
suggests the need for an historical perspective.13 "Feminism" is a word
12 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (holding that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
13 See Siona Carpenter, Ms. Judgments, The Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Sept. 20,
1994, at Cl. In an interview with Gloria Steinem, Carpenter asked if it bothered Steinem
that recent Gallup Poll results indicated that "sixty-four percent of the more than one thou-
sand women surveyed said they didn't identify themselves as feminists." Steinem, not sur-
prised, responded that some women feared identifying themselves as feminists, in part be-
cause the backlash movement has succeeded in associating feminism with adjectives such
as "extremist" and "man-hating." Id. Other unpleasant connotations that many young
women say they associate with feminism cover a spectrum of "ugly stereotypes"-that they
are "bra-burning, hairy-legged, amazon, castrating, uptight and man-haters." Barbara
Brotman, Younger Activists Say that Steinem Has Had Her Day, The Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Sept. 6, 1994, at El (quoting Paula Kamen, who surveyed young women for
her book, Feminist Fatale (1991)).
Women and girls may also fear associating themselves with feminism based on opposi-
tion to abortion, resistance to perceiving themselves as victims, and homophobia. See
Barbara Carton, A Rebel in the Sisterhood: Author Christina Sommers Wants to Rescue
Feminism From its "Hijackers," Boston Globe, June 16, 1994, at 69; Daley Haggar, Why
Fear the Word "Feminist"?, Dallas Morning News, June 1, 1994, at A23 (writing that many
teenage girls associate feminists with "man-hating lesbians" despite agreeing "with the
goals of feminism: equal pay, equal opportunity and mutual respect between the sexes");
Wendy Kaminer, Feminism's Identity Crisis, The Atlantic, Oct. 1993, at 51, (noting that
"middle-class family women sometimes associate feminism with lesbianism, which has yet
to gain middle-class respectability"); Loraine O'Connell, The Fight Over Feminism: Does
the Feminist Viewpoint Treat Women As Victims? Were the Early Days More About
Equality? Writers Square Off, The Gazette (Montreal), July 11, 1994, at D3; see also, Mary
C. Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Feminism, 4 Berkeley
Women's L.J. 251 (1989-90) (suggesting that "causes central to women" like "abortion
1994] Feminist Lawmaking
that has been used for many decades. It has an historical meaning, be-
yond the particular struggles of the 1990s, which connotes a supporter
of women's rights. Recent negative associations with the word
"feminism" are not a contemporary phenomenon, but part of a long
historical process of "backlash" that must be carefully analyzed and
explained.
Santayana's truism-that those who do not learn from history are
doomed to repeat it-is true for feminists in law as well. Documenting
and studying our history are crucial. Ahistoricism is a serious problem
for all grass roots groups who do not have the resources to gain access
to their own history, especially for women, whose history has long
been invisible.' 4 It is also a particular problem for lawyers, since a
choice, sexual violence, lesbian rights, sexual speech, [and] sex education" are considered
"dirty" by many people); Deirdre English, Fear of Feminism, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1994, at
X7, noting that, many mainstream women reject the feminist label because they associate
feminists with selfish women, who put themselves before their families. Women also "fear
losing things they like best about being female" like potentially being able to choose to
"stay home with children full or part-time."
14 For provocative discussion of ahistoricism and the role of history in feminism, see
Jeanne L. Schroeder, History's Challenge to Feminism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1889 (1990);
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1135 (1990). In the latter article,
Schroeder argues that contemporary feminist theories, particularly those of Robin West, are
ahistorical in two senses:
By ahistorical, I mean two things. First, these theories are based on
the sense of self personally experienced by late twentieth-century
American white professional-class individuals, and do not take into ac-
count the very different selves experienced by people living in other
cultures and other historical periods. This sense of the "self"--the me-
diating experience of individuality and community-has been perceived
differently in past societies, and to a large extent may be culturally de-
termined. To derive essentialist theories of human nature and gender
from only our own personal experience and the experiences of our
contemporary intellectual neighbors is an act of cultural hubris, doomed
to error and historic triviality.
Second, insofar as it accepts modem cultural descriptions of per-
sonality as universal, modem feminist jurisprudence fails to recognize
the historical roots of the prejudices on which it is based. Indeed, if all
we had to go by were our own experiences, the distinction between uni-
versal and historical descriptions would be very difficult to grasp. While
it may be true that the theories described by West explain many of our
social institutions, that may be so only because we have inherited many
of these institutions from the Middle Ages. That is, the theories de-
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certain parochialism and lack of respect for history shapes the study of
law. Much contemporary scholarship and public discussion of issues
of feminist legal theory and practice fail to provide this historical
context, presenting issues and ideas as if they have emerged anew. For
example, feminists in the 1920s, not just feminists in the 1980s, de-
bated whether special protective legislation helped or hurt women. 15 In
order to move forward, we must look to the past, because the past
shapes the present and the future.
An historical perspective on feminism means also looking to the
future and understanding that new ideas and issues will unfold as
struggles develop and change. The "dialectical nature of rights and
politics" that I have described elsewhere details an historical and evo-
lutionary process, whereby rights claims emerge from political strug-
gle, and the assertion of rights claims in turn reshape the political
struggle.' 6 My current project is the exploration of the tensions, con-
tradictions, and possibilities of feminist lawmaking and feminist the-
ory in one particular dimension of women's rights-violence against
women.17
scribed by West may merely mirror the historical rationales for the very
institutions these theories are attempting to critique. It is poor method-
ology to examine our own jurisprudence without also examining the
culture and thought of the intellectual grandparents who gave birth to
many of the ideas and cultural presuppositions of contemporary law and
society. We may find that modem theories are not a discovery of univer-
sal metaphysical truths, but merely a repetition of the same old lies in
modem dress. What has been called "feminism unmodified" may well
be old fashioned "masculism" with minor modifications. On the other
hand, these old stories might be repeated because they are partly consti-
tuted by some universal truths that can be recognized cross-culturally,
even if previously imperfectly understood and distorted. In either case,
historical analysis will enrich the analysis.
Id. at 1137-39 (footnotes omitted).
15 Babcock et al., supra note 6, at 247-68.
16 Schneider, supra note 11.
17 For examples of my work that comprise part of this project, see Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 520 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 195 (1986); Elizabeth
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Domestic violence has only developed as an important feminist is-
sue over the last twenty-five years. Yet we can see examples of this
dialectical process of formulation and reformulation in recent law re-
form efforts concerning domestic violence. For example, recent legis-
lation and public education efforts on stalking have expanded our per-
spective on domestic violence.'8 Our insights into domestic violence
have been deepened by linking problems of workplace violence with
domestic violence, and recognizing the problems that women face in
the workplace because of domestic violence. 19  Finally, our
understanding of domestic violence has been enriched by the concep-
M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623 (1980).
18 For example, California has one of the most comprehensive criminal anti-stalking stat-
utes after which many other states have modeled their statutes. California makes the crime
of stalking punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to a year and/or a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, unless the stalker violates an order of protection, in which
case the crime may be punishable by imprisonment for two to four years. Cal. Penal Code
§ 646.9(a), (b) (West 1988). For other commentary on stalking, see Robert P. Faulkner &
Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antistalking
Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1994); Susan Berstein,
Note, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 525 (1993) (arguing that if stalking is viewed as an aspect of separation as-
sault, then lawmakers, policymakers, and the courts will be more inclined to take the issues
of domestic violence more seriously); Laurie Salame, Note, A National Survey of Stalking
Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 67 (1993) (noting that in order to understand stalking by an ex-intimate
there must first be an understanding of domestic violence and the cycle of a battering rela-
tionship); Brenda A. Sanford, Comment, Stalking Is Now Illegal: Will A Paper Law Make a
Difference, 10 Cooley L. Rev. 409 (1993).
19 See BLS Reports, 6,000 Annual Fatal Injuries, Occupational Safety and Health Daily
(BNA), Oct. 12, 1993, at 1 (noting that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that violence
against women on the job accounts for 40% of all female job-related fatalities); Stuart
Silverstein, Stalked by Violence on the Job: Domestic Violence is Spilling Over Into the
Workplace, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1994, at Al (noting that U.S. Department of Justice reports
indicate that husbands and boyfriends commit more than 13,000 acts of violence against
women in the workplace each year and that some employers handle the problem by firing or
suspending the female worker); Violent Deaths on the Job, Houston Chronicle, Sept. 5,
1993, at A10 (noting that National Safe Workplace Institute reports state that 40% of all
women who are killed on the job die from violent attacks); Michael G. Wagner, Rising Tide
of Workplace Violence Against Women, Sacramento Bee, June 13, 1993, at A6 (reporting
that two out of every five women who die at work in California are homicide victims, which
can be attributed in part to spousal abuse and stalking that spills into the workplace).
1994]
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tualization of domestic violence within the framework of international
human rights.20
Dramatic changes in this area of law over the last twenty-five
years emphasize the importance of feminist lawmaking and women's
role in making history. At the same time, these changes underscore the
need to take this history and move it forward to develop new strategies
and perspectives. New areas of work in domestic violence suggest the
need to rethink feminist lawmaking strategies in light of dynamic
changes in the world. However, we cannot advance our lawmaking
strategies without historical consciousness We cannot move forward
without understanding the strengths and limitations of feminist efforts
in the past.
20 Through human rights dialogue, women's organizations have called on nations to as-
sume accountability for violence against women. This movement challenges the public-pri-
vate dichotomy of violence against women, and underscores the role of dominance and sub-
ordination-a theme that crosses national barriers. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the
Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
291 (1994); Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to
State Protection From Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 507 (1993);
Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against
Women, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 195 (1993); see also Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as
Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 486 (1990); Karen
Bower, Note, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the Basis of
Membership in a Particular Social Group, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 173 (1993).
Violence against women captured the attention of the international human rights com-
munity at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, where the
General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on members to recognize the rights of
women. See United Nations, General Assembly, Third Committee; Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994); United Nations,
General Assembly; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993). For examples of the widespread media attention this has received,
see Lee Michael Katz, U.N. Tribunal Puts Focus on Women, Abuse, USA Today, June 15,
1993, at 7A (stating that African and Third World women spoke out about violence against
women at the U.N. Women's Tribunal in Vienna); Anne Reifenberg, U.N. Adopts Wide-
Ranging Human Rights Declaration, Dallas Morning News, June 26, 1993, at Al (reporting
that a U.N. declaration was praised for its "unprecedented and potent language denouncing
violence against women and all discrimination based on gender"); Alan Riding, Women
Seize Focus at Rights Forum, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1993, at A3 (reporting that a Global
Campaign for Women's Human Rights, including 950 different women's organizations
from around the world, focused at the conference on the need to end "a series of acute hu-
man rights abuses suffered by women because they are women"); U.N. to Appoint
Investigator of Abuse to Women, Chi. Trib., Mar. 6, 1994, at 22 (stating that the U.N.
Human Rights Commission agreed to appoint a special investigator to look into violence
against women, its causes, and its consequences).
